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Abstract 
 Throughout all of Rousseau’s works there is tension between 
argumentation and feeling, speculation and intuition, reason and conscience. 
Reason binds men when they think correctly, but divides them and opposes 
one to the other when they place it at the service of self-interest, of ambition 
and of the will to prevail. Conversely, the universality of conscience is 
immediate and transparent: it transmits the truth of the existence of God, of 
the freedom of men, of the distinction between good and evil, as well as of 
the universal principles that are at the roots of human action and of the 
virtues honoured by all human societies, despite the differences of particular 
legislations. Mankind possesses an innate and intuitive conscience of the 
fundamental principles by which its conduct must be inspired. Were we to 
consider human actions only according to the criterion of physical need, of 
causality and of movement, vices and virtues would disappear and terms like 
morality and honesty would have no meaning. But each one of us perceives 
from within that this is not the case. We feel that moral good and evil are 
more real than anything else, without any need whatsoever to prove it. To 
obey the conscience one has of good and of evil without human mediation 
means to reject the dogmatic formalism of religions as well as the vanity of 
philosophical disputes. Every human being, however, is inserted into a 
national community. What should the state’s attitude be vis-à-vis religion? 
Rousseau indicates two paths. The first consists in establishing a purely civil 
religion that admits only those dogmas that are truly useful to society. 
Rousseau highlights the contradiction of a Christian religion that, although it 
is the religion of peace par excellence, fuels continuing bloody clashes 
among men due to a dogmatic theology that is totally alien to the essence of 
the Gospel and extremely hazardous for the life of the State. The second path 
consists in allowing Christianity to retain its authentic spirit, its freedom 
from any material constraint, without any obligations other than those of 
individual conscience. The Christian religion has such a pure and noble 
moral that it cannot but benefit the State, as long as one does not expect to 
make it part of the constitution. 
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The Fragment On God 
 According to Pierre Burgelin one should accept Théophile Dufour’s 
theory that the fragment was composed in 1735, when Rousseau was about 
23 years old (Burgelin 1952). The fragment On God demonstrates that, for 
Rousseau, the existence of God is not an abstract speculative issue but rather 
is closely connected to the problem of evil and of freedom. Our conviction 
that a God exists, Rousseau argues, is incompatible with the principles that in 
fact inspire our conduct in this life6. The notion of God is inseparable from 
the idea of eternal and of infinite. What else is infinite in God other than 
intelligence, wisdom, justice and power? Rousseau believes that it would be 
much easier to eradicate from one’s inner self the feeling of the existence of 
God rather than conceive it without assigning to it the attributes mentioned 
above and that, taken all together, represent the only way in which we can 
conceive God Himself. Thus, if the power of God is infinite, it follows that 
this power necessarily extends to the entirety of our being. And since God is 
the source of all wisdom, He will expect men to govern themselves 
according to the principles that He has placed in their spirit as the basis of 
virtue and of religion (Rousseau 2012, XVII, 439-440). 
 Should God have used his infinite power to force men to act 
according to his principles, he would have been legitimated in doing so by 
his own infinite wisdom, since men’s obedience of his decrees would have 
made them virtuous. If instead one looks at how men do behave, one sees 
immediately that they do not follow the divine orders that God himself has 
placed in their hearts. The obvious conclusion is that God has not used His 
infinite power to force them to obey his decrees, given that, obviously, if he 
had indeed done so, no one could have evaded His will because God’s power 
is infinite. Rousseau implicitly reasons that if God had forced men to follow 
his decrees, however, moral perfection would not have been the result of 
their effort and commitment. They could not have claimed merit for the 
virtue they would have given proof of, and therefore they would not have 
been virtuous either. The obstacle to virtue could not be external, however 
(only the help in becoming perfectly virtuous could come from the exterior), 
since the impossibility of overcoming the obstacle in doing good would have 
excused and removed the vice as such. Thus, the obstacle would have had to 
                                                          
6 Masson attributes an autobiographical meaning to this statement, which he finds banal. In 
fact, in the same year (1735), Rousseau wrote to his father (X, 12): «J’ai de la religion et je 
crains Dieu; d’ailleurs, sujet à d’extrêmes faiblesses et rempli de défauts plus qu’aucun autre 
homme du monde, je sens combien il y a de vices à corriger chez moi» (Masson 1970, 91). 
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be internal and subjective. It was necessary for the difference between the 
divine decrees and the principles inspiring the actions of men to be 
exclusively a result of their free will. Evil is nothing but the existence of evil 
beings, to the point that one can say that, already in this fragment, Rousseau 
better specifically defines evil “in se” with the exact term of moral evil. The 
existence of wicked men does not disprove the existence of God or His 
infinite power. In just a few words Rousseau shows that, instead, the evil 
beings, with their very existence, show God’s will to allow mankind the final 
decision, i.e. absolute autonomy in the intended use of their freedom.  
 
The Two Prayers 
 Dufour’s theory that the two prayers dating back to Rousseau’s youth 
were written in Charmettes in 1738 or 1739 was taken up by Courtois 
(Courtois 1969, 1763-1764). Pierre-Maurice Masson provided a commentary 
(Masson 1970, 120-128). In a passage from the Confessions, Rousseau tells 
us that, when he was in Charmettes, he would rise before dawn and take a 
walk, elevating a prayer to the author of the beautiful sights his eyes were 
enjoying. Rousseau confesses he never prayed in his bedroom because he felt 
that the walls and everything else made by man acted as an obstacle between 
him and God. His desire was to relate to God directly (Rousseau 2012, I, 
339). In his prayers to God, Rousseau expressed more his admiration and 
contemplation than requests, because he knew that to obtain the true gifts 
from God it was not enough to request them, you had to deserve them 
(Rousseau 2012, XVII, 444-445). Rousseau asks God for what he already 
knows he possesses within him, what he knows he has received from Him. 
Indeed, God has placed in his heart the principles of his wisdom and the 
freedom to be inspired by them in his actions. Man alone is responsible for 
taking the initiative in realising virtue. So, in actual fact, Rousseau’s prayer 
is an expression of praise of God. 
 Innocence and virtue are attained by sacrificing the artificial status in 
which man finds himself in civil life. All that mankind has built in the 
centuries is nothing but a tragic and fatal shift from the original perfection in 
which men and nature find themselves when coming out of the hands of 
God. In the Prayer we find confirmed the affective tonality that Rousseau 
expresses in the Confessions: the prayer to a God that is both to be feared 
and merciful is essentially a way of expressing thanks for all the good 
received, i.e., in the right order: birth, the rational soul, the knowledge of 
God. God is also thanked, however, for having seen to human needs, for 
having cured infirmity and finally for having united the ones with the others. 
Rousseau especially asks God to point him in the direction of virtue and not 
to make him so unhappy as to doubt the very existence of God (Rousseau 
2012, XVII, 445). 
European Scientific Journal October 2016 edition vol.12, No.29  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
 
 
13 
 His acknowledgement of Divine providence is reiterated in the 
second prayer, in contrast with the negation of Divine intervention in history 
that he states elsewhere. The God Rousseau turns to with this prayer is at the 
same time infinitely powerful and good. With respect to this God, the 
existence of evil men is not at all a contradiction, precisely because, 
according to Rousseau, the only evil worthy of being taken into 
consideration is moral evil, subject only to the free will of men. Rousseau 
praises God for having created him from nothing (God can create from 
nothing a living being that by itself is incapable of giving itself life or of 
coming from nothing), for having given him a rational soul, for having 
impressed in his heart laws that, when put in practice, are a guarantee of 
eternal joy and tend to bring joy in this life too (Rousseau 2012, XVII, 446). 
In this second prayer, for the most part a praise to God, Rousseau once again 
asks for mercy for his weaknesses and for help in fighting the vices in which 
his weaknesses have dragged him. He confesses that all of the pleasures that 
his abandonment of wisdom has led him to turned out to be painful and 
hateful illusions (Rousseau 2012, XVII, 447). Most of all, he asks for 
forgiveness for not having been able to put to good use his life, his freedom 
and all of the means God has given him, including reason, in order to acquire 
virtue and to become worthy of eternal joy. Repentant, Rousseau promises to 
follow righteousness, relating all of his actions to God himself, to meditate 
Him, to bless Him, to serve Him, to fear Him. He also promises to love his 
neighbour, to help the wretched and the unfortunate. Rousseau promises 
moderation and purity in his every action, control of anger and of speech. 
The only pleasures he will allow himself will be those allowed by virtue. He 
shall detach himself from the world and from its comforts, to dedicate 
himself only to divine perfection. With evangelical purpose he shall forgive 
everyone, in turn staying away from offending anyone. Finally, in submitting 
himself to God and to His supreme will, Rousseau states his intention to 
prepare himself for death and for the judgement to which his conduct will be 
subjected. In preparing himself to live his life in the most perfect obedience 
of divine law, Rousseau declares he is aware that, without the grace of God, 
no project can be accomplished and any intent is destined to fail. 
 
Letter to François-Marie Arouet dit Voltaire (18 August 1756) 
 Why is it that the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 has stuck in mankind’s 
memory more than any other disaster before and after it? Why did it strike 
the contemporaries as something absolutely “unique and surprising”?7 Just 
ten years before, in October of 1746, a terrible earthquake had flattened the 
city of Lima, the capital of Peru, killing twenty thousand people, while the 
                                                          
7 According to the definition by Walter Benjamin (Tagliapietra 2004, IX). 
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Chinese earthquakes of Qili and Peking that had occurred a few decades 
before then had claimed the lives of two hundred thousand people. The 
earthquake, to this day declared the bloodiest of them all, that hit China in 
the mid-16th century, killed eight hundred and thirty thousand people, 
according to the chronicles of the time. What made the Lisbon earthquake so 
memorable was its position. It became unique and unrepeatable because it hit 
Lisbon, namely Atlantic Europe. It wasn’t an exotic cataclysm, the more 
extreme the more marginal. News of the Lisbon earthquake spread like 
wildfire throughout Europe and caused a vast multitude of writings. The 
earthquake, that struck on the day of All Saints of 1755, produced 
objectively disturbing effects. Walter Benjamin refers that it was felt in the 
whole of Europe and all the way to Africa. The tsunami was experienced 
from Finland to Indonesia (Tagliapietra 2004, XIII). It has been calculated 
that with its farthest waves it covered a surface two and a half million 
kilometers wide. 
 Voltaire learned about the Lisbon catastrophe on November 23rd. 
Deeply perturbed by the news, he wrote off in less than twenty days the 234 
verses of his Poem on the Lisbon Disaster that, published on April 1st, 1756, 
was enormously successful and underwent many reprints in a very short 
time. Voltaire’s poem is an accusation against God and a lecture against 
optimism. The topic is the Epicurean dilemma, frequently discussed by 
philosophers in anti-theologian terms. Epicurus’ formidolosum argumentum 
was presented by Caecilius Firmianus Lactantius in chapter XIII of the De 
Ira Dei (Migne 1841-1864, 7, coll. 77-146, 121A-B) and can be 
schematically illustrated as follows (Tagliapietra 2004, 37): 
 God does not want to 
remove evil 
God wants to remove evil 
God is unable to remove 
evil 
God is neither benevolent 
nor omnipotent 
God is not omnipotent 
God is able to remove evil God is not benevolent Then why does evil exist? 
 
 By picking up Epicurus’ formidolosum argumentum, Voltaire is filled 
with indignation before this image of a God that remains indifferent to the 
death and suffering for which instead He should feel responsible. Voltaire 
simply cannot tolerate this merciless, calm and indifferent God. God’s 
silence seems unacceptable to him, just like he cannot stand “Job’s friends”, 
i.e. all of the optimists of every era that explain divine inaction with man’s 
guilt. Voltaire asks that all of “Job’s friends” be silent, so that all of the 
unfortunate, the victims of catastrophes, may lift their innocent cry. 
 In response to Voltaire’s sending him his two poems Sur la loi 
naturelle and Sur le désastre de Lisbonne, Rousseau writes to the author of 
Candide a subtle letter that certainly must have surprised the recipient. In his 
Poem on the Lisbon Disaster Voltaire uses the earthquake as an argument to 
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ridicule the optimism professed by Pope and by Leibniz, who say that all is 
good despite the most overwhelming evidence to the contrary. But, Rousseau 
objects, in this manner mankind’s misery is exacerbated to such an extent as 
to become unbearable. Imagining that Voltaire had displayed irremediable 
pessimism, almost as if in this way the unhappy may set their minds at rest 
thanks to the demonstration that all is evil, Rousseau warns Voltaire that 
exactly the opposite happens: «This optimism which you find so cruel yet 
consoles me amid the very pains which you depict as unbearable» (Rousseau 
2012, XVII, 474). Rousseau finds Voltaire’s poem unacceptable because it 
does not allow the suffering man any hope vis-à-vis an evil that God himself 
does not remove from the world despite his omnipotence. Rousseau admits 
to having represented human misery in the Discours sur l’origine et les 
fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes (published in Amsterdam in 
1755), but at least he did so not to prove their inevitability, but rather to 
teach men that they are the ones responsible for their misfortunes and to 
show them how to overcome this state of affairs. Rousseau once again makes 
a distinction between physical evil and moral evil. The origin of moral evil 
must be sought for in the free man who has achieved a certain degree of 
perfection and at the same time of corruption8. 
Ultimately, man is also responsible for natural evil. Physical pains are 
inevitable, because they are generated by the structure of matter; or apparent, 
such as death, that is an evil only for the way in which it is awaited and one 
prepares for it; or, finally, it is evitable, just like most illnesses, that are the 
consequences of the enfeeblement of the organism caused by our abandoning 
the simple and solitary lifestyle of our origins. Following a line of reasoning 
that later would have been adopted by Kant and that today represents the 
fundamental principle of prevention in the field of civil defense, Rousseau 
argues that, though the Lisbon earthquake was inevitable, its effects would 
have been drastically reduced had the residential housing been more 
carefully planned (lower buildings, better distributed over the land, etc.). 
Moreover, one must consider that premature death is not always an absolute 
evil. To the contrary, many of the unfortunate who died under the rubble 
may have avoided greater misfortunes, such as for example dying pestered 
by notaries and heirs, or killed in their beds by arrogant and unscrupulous 
physicians. The natural miseries that we suffer, Rousseau concludes, are 
much less cruel than those we cause ourselves with our choices. The miseries 
caused by man could be much worse (Rousseau 2012, XVII, 476-477). Life 
becomes an unbearable weight for those who have moved away from nature, 
mostly men of letters, the most sedentary, the most inclined to reflection and, 
                                                          
8 «Je ne vois pas qu’on puisse chercher la source du mal moral ailleurs que dans l’homme 
libre, perfectionné, partant corrompu» (Rousseau 2012, XVII, 476) 
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in consequence, the most unhappy. The philosophers, because they have lost 
the capacity to feel the joy of living, slander life with the argument that death 
is inevitable. Cato shows with his life that the wise man can decide to give 
up life with dignity, but that the misfortune that comes our way does not 
make life a “bad present”.  
 Rousseau states his disagreement with Voltaire as regards a theory 
supported by de Crousaz, citing which Voltaire says that it is not true that if 
one single atom were removed from the world, the world would no longer 
exist; and that nature is not subject to any precise measure, precise form or 
unfailing, rigorous and predetermined law. According to Rousseau, the 
irregularities mentioned by Voltaire in support of his thesis on nature’s 
imprecision were certainly due to laws still unknown at that time. 
Conversely, one would have to admit the possibility of effects without 
causes, something that no philosophical system acknowledges. Two balanced 
weights, one of which hiding a magnet, would show a manifest behaviour, in 
response to an extra force or an extra weight, that would apparently confirm 
the possibility of there being a cause without an effect and an effect without 
a cause. But to the person who then discovers the existence and action of the 
magnet, the precision and rigour of nature would be confirmed. Rousseau 
considers the example of the two balanced weights as paradigmatic and 
applicable in general to the entire world of phenomena, thus confirming his 
deterministic view of material nature, in perfect agreement with the 
metaphysical dualism expressed in his Letter to M. de Franquières and in the 
Profession of Faith. But here the reader also extracts an implicit answer to 
the question of the earthquake and of disasters in general. Indeed, nature is a 
perfect mechanism, the processes of which can be understood only in the 
light of the principle of causality. Thus, there is no Providence that governs 
nature9. After all, Voltaire’s pessimism is a reproach to the divinity and 
reveals a totally pre-rational concept of nature. Nature does all that it must do 
and some of its phenomena are interpreted from a theological viewpoint only 
because we ignore the laws that, sooner or later, will be discovered to be the 
origin of such singular events.  
Voltaire’s mistake, Rousseau believes, consists in the claim that 
mankind’s future is more dear to God than that of any other being, intelligent 
                                                          
9 One would be tempted to detect a contradiction between this theory and the position 
Rousseau defends in the Profession of Faith, where he attributes the movement of matter, 
ultimately, to a cause that is God Himself. The contradiction is only apparent, however, 
because God moves nature according to a necessary order that He could violate, if He 
wished to, but that He does not violate in order to be coherent with Himself. In short, 
although God is the ultimate cause of movement, the natural processes occur based on an 
absolutely inviolable necessity, in a state of perfect autonomy that makes the moral classes 
of good and evil inapplicable. 
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or not, dispersed in the universe. Voltaire’s anthropocentric view is the 
expression of a vaniloquent egocentrism that fails to take into account the 
totality of the universe and expects to judge everything based on the 
subjective condition of a few individuals. Instead, nature should be 
considered in its entirety: without the totality category, the comprehension of 
both nature and society is destined to fail. From the viewpoint of totality, 
even the most catastrophic of events is capable of causing positive effects: 
«If, in the system of the universe, it is necessary to the preservation of 
mankind that there be a cycle of substance between man, animals and 
vegetation, then one individual’s particular evil contributes to the general 
good: I die, I am eaten by worms, but my children, my brothers will live as I 
have lived» (Rousseau 2012, XVII, 486). Rousseau makes a distinction 
between general and individual evil. Although the latter has never been 
denied by any philosopher, when it comes to the former it is necessary to 
state whether the existence of the universe is a good thing per se. The 
addition of an article is therefore justified: we will not say all is good (tout 
est bien), but rather the whole is good (le tout est bien) or all is good for the 
whole (tout est bien pour le tout).  
Rousseau accuses priests and the devout of having promoted a faulty 
type of theology of nature by attributing to divine Providence, rather than to 
nature, effects that would have occurred even without divine intervention. By 
interpreting nature’s phenomena as beneficial for the good or damaging for 
the wicked, priests favour an egotistical and anthropomorphic perception of 
nature and Providence. Philosophers are scarcely more reasonable than 
priests when they accuse God for every little thing, like when they «cry out 
that all is lost when they have a toothache, or are poor, or get robbed, and 
hold God responsible, as Seneca says, for looking after their luggage» 
(Rousseau 2012, XVII, 488-489). Whichever the facts nature gives rise to, 
priests and philosophers express their views in opposite manners: 
«Providence is always right among the devout, and always wrong among the 
philosophers» (Rousseau 2012, XVII, 489). No one dwells on whether it is 
right or wrong, because everything in nature occurs according to a single law 
that makes no exceptions whatsoever. According to Rousseau, in the eyes of 
God the particular has no value, in the same way as the particular will does 
not and must not bear any weight compared to the general will. One 
therefore must free God from the misunderstandings and accusations the 
devout and the philosophers soil Him with, because one cannot state the 
existence of God and then attribute to Him actions unworthy of Him. In this 
manner, Rousseau’s theological coherence comes full circle: «If God exists, 
He is perfect; if He is perfect, He is wise, powerful, and just; if He is wise 
and powerful, all is good; if He is just and powerful, my soul is immortal; if 
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my soul is immortal, thirty years of life are nothing to me and are perhaps 
necessary to the preservation of the universe» (Rousseau 2012, XVII, 490). 
But God exists. His existence cannot be proven definitely by reason, by the 
objections and by the answers to said objections, because disputes are based 
on the knowledge of things about which men have no true idea. And if 
reason is insufficient, faith must take over, because «the state of doubt is too 
violent a state for my soul» (Rousseau 2012, XVII, 491)10.  
                                                          
10 A God limited by laws becomes a real contradiction: an impotent God who couldn’t be 
trusted to keep his promise to make the Hebrew people the elected people. The Book of Job 
should have resolved that paradox. The story of Job seems incomprehensible if one takes the 
point of view of the citizens of a modern state, who expect that the sovereign will respect his 
contractual obligations and they don’t award him any powers to decide by himself, without 
consulting them and over and above the prevailing laws. Carl Schmitt repeats the judgment 
of the Book of Job, according to which it is impossible to trust any inviolable rule, law or 
principle. The sovereign as such is he who holds the power of exemption and can establish 
the state of exception. The power to impose respect for shared rules presupposes the 
prerogative to suspend or invalidate them. Without this prerogative no power exists, but only 
impotence. Bauman cites Agamben, who grasped the absence of contradiction between 
establishing a rule and making an exception. This therefore is the truth behind power (Z. 
Bauman – G. Dessal, El retorno del péndulo. Sobre psicoanálisis y el futuro del mundo 
liquido, 2014, trad. it., Il ritorno del pendolo. Psicoanalisi e futuro del mondo liquido, edited 
by R. Mazzeo, Erickson, Trento 2015, 80). The story told in the book of Job represents a 
challenge to the capacity of the comprehension of human beings, who await the restitution 
and respect of the law. These same theologists, in the book of Job, insinuate that Job must 
have committed a serious sin that justifies the ruin into which Job has fallen, thus 
demonstrating that they believe firmly in the connection between sin and punishment, virtue 
and recompense, in the only way in which, to their eyes, makes it possible to justify 
unspeakable sufferings that are inflicted on an apparently just and God-fearing man. But 
Job, despite protesting his innocence and good faith, knows that when it comes to God, no 
rule holds water. Job couldn’t have known, comments Bauman, that in the coming centuries 
all those who had aspired to an absolute power, next to the divine omnipotence, would have 
easily utilised the unforeseeability and capricious discretion as massly efficient tools to 
obtain obedience and submission amongst their subjects. Bauman cites the work of Susan 
Neiman, Evil in modern thought: an Alternative History of Philosophy (2003) and Jean-
Pierre Dupuy, Pétite Métaphysique des tsunamis (2007), which suggested that the Lisbon 
earthquake of 1755, with its earthquakes, fires and tsunamis in rapid succession, would have 
signalled the beginning of the modern philosophy of evil, which implies the clear separation 
between natural disasters and moral evil: the former conceived as being dominated by a 
blind coincidence that depends neither on God, nor on men, whereas the latter conceived the 
only evil that humans have the capacity to avoid being characterized by intentionality. 
According to Neiman, starting with Lisbon, natural evil is devoid of intention, as opposed to 
moral evil that is characterized by being intentional and deliberate. According to Dupuy, the 
most modern amongst the participants of the debate was Rousseau with his open letter to 
Voltaire. Here Rousseau continues to state that the fault - not of the disaster, but of its 
catastrophic consequences - must be attributed to human beings and not to nature. 
According to Rousseau the catastrophe was the result of man’s short-sightedness and not the 
blindness of nature. If the dwellings had been distributed better across the land and had 
better anti-seismic measures been adopted, the disaster wouldn’t have had such catastrophic 
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 Rousseau certainly concedes that Voltaire is right on many points. 
Like Voltaire, he says he is indignant about the fact that each one’s faith is 
not perfectly free and that someone may claim the right to subordinate reason 
to authority, acknowledging the right of the State to control consciences. 
Anticipating the theories championed in the last part of the Social Contract, 
Rousseau admits that governments should limit their sphere of influence to 
civil duties and have no right to prescribe any positive precepts on how each 
one must serve God. Laws may impose a sort of profession of faith but, with 
the exclusion of the principles of morality and natural law, this profession 
must be purely negative, it must defend society from religions that attack its 
foundations and threaten the peace of the State. The profession of faith 
includes several dogmas that should be prohibited: intolerance and 
fanaticism (the intolerant imagines that it is impossible to be a good man 
without believing what he believes). A State can exist only if several positive 
social principles are complied with; these are listed in the Social Contract 
IV, 8: the existence of a mighty, intelligent and beneficent divinity, 
                                                                                                                                                     
consequences or, perhaps, wouldn’t even have happened. Therefore the Lisbon disaster, 
according to Rousseau, was caused by the improvidence and greed of human beings, exactly 
as we today could complain about the fact that, in the case of an unforeseeable eruption of 
an unheard of duration and intensity of Vesuvius or Etna, the majority of deaths would be 
the consequence of the brainless construction of numerous dwellings almost on the rim of 
volcanic craters. The modern conception of evil as an essentially and exclusively moral evil, 
however, hasn’t solved the question as far as the optimism with which it was inaugurated is 
concerned. The distinction between man and nature represents a success, but their 
separation, as Auschwitz has shown, is neither easy nor definitive. The identification of 
human responsibilities does not determine automatically the prevention of either moral evil 
or of suffering that nature can scatter at will with total indifference. «In Lisbon, humankind 
loses faith in himself», comments Neiman cited by Bauman. With Lisbon the awareness of 
the futility of the traditional theodicy began, according to which «natural disasters that fall 
upon humanity are the same punishments inflicted by God (at the same time supreme ethical 
legislator, final court of justice and executive branch of moral law) to sinners» (Z. Bauman – 
G. Dessal, El retorno del péndulo. Sobre psicoanálisis y el futuro del mundo liquido, cit., 
84). The blind frequency with which evil pervaded the world could not be reconciled with 
the combination of the omnipotence and benevolence attributed to the Creator and 
Sovereign of the world. It didn’t add up, but to make it do so, one tried to load the shoulders 
of human beings with the entire responsibility of the evils that affect them. The finitude, 
pain and death ceased to be considered as evil, given that a justification could be found in 
the context of universal nature, as opposed to the theodicy that aimed to identify the cause of 
death and suffering in the original sin and individual sins. Max Weber would have removed 
the contradiction of the theodicy through his concept of disenchantment or loss of divinity, 
that strips nature of her divine cloak, of subjectivity capable of benevolence or malignancy. 
“However, warns Bauman, Nature wasn’t stripped of her subjectivity in order to restore and 
safeguard the subjectivity of God, but rather to prepare the way for a deification of his 
human subject» (Z. Bauman – G. Dessal, El retorno del péndulo. Sobre psicoanálisis y el 
futuro del mundo liquido, cit., 85). 
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possessed of foresight and providence; the life to come, the happiness of the 
just and the punishment of the wicked; the sacredness of the social contract 
and the laws. 
 The lack of comprehension between Rousseau and his 
contemporaries is largely due to the singularity of his position regarding the 
revelation and, more in general, the question of religion. Unlike most of his 
peers who contested religion on the basis of theoretical motivations and who, 
by rejecting dogmas on the grounds of irrationality, also do away with 
religion as such, Rousseau places in the foreground the natural religion − 
that religion that each one of us feels in his/her own heart in the immediate 
and universal form of duties to be accomplished. Dogma is worth nothing, 
morality is everything and God demands that man, in charge of his own 
actions, pursue virtue (Rousseau 1969, IV, 1077). 
God immediately reveals Himself to the human conscience as the 
indisputable source of the notions of good and evil that each one of us learns 
within himself without the need to think. The relationship between man and 
God is primary, it precedes any specific cult, it represents the reference by 
which one judges every historical revelation. The subjective starting point is 
not an abstract principle or a rationally demonstrable truth, but rather the 
immediate, instinctively irrefutable certainty of one’s own freedom: man 
feels he is the author of his own actions and thus is free from the moment in 
which he feels within himself (and cannot but feel) the discrepancy between 
the action he commits and the principles to which he should conform. The 
moral sphere in which God reveals Himself immediately to the heart of men 
subtracts itself a priori from any analysis by the formal reason and cannot be 
subjected to any skeptic criticism. Men shall have to answer for their actions, 
not for what they have believed in or thought, since they possess the intuition 
of good and evil but not an infallible knowledge of truth and untruth 
(Rousseau 1969, IV, 1077). In fact, what could be more unjust than to expect 
perfect knowledge in mankind when it cannot achieve such a goal because it 
has not been endowed with the faculty to achieve it? So, undoubtedly, if one 
were to choose between being virtuous without believing in anything, and 
having a dead faith without results, one should select the former (Rousseau 
1969, IV, 1078). 
The religion of the heart, therefore, has precedence over positive 
revelation. The former is synthetic, the latter analytical. The former is all one 
with man’s sensitivity and action, the latter distracts from good and from 
virtue, demanding the manifestation of a purely exterior faith, of arbitrary 
cults and formal behaviours, more suitable for gratifying and reassuring the 
hierarchy of the Church and the political powers than for generating peace in 
the heart, true wisdom, authentic virtue and the salvation of humanity. No 
authority can perform inspections or expect individuals to conform to some 
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revealed religion. Governments must restrict themselves to demanding the 
performance of civic duties. In contrast with Thomas Hobbes, Rousseau 
argues that when a man serves the state well, he owes no one an account of 
how he serves God (Rousseau 1969, IV, 1078). 
 
The Moral Letters 
 The year 1757 marks Rousseau’s irrepressible passion for Countess 
Sophie d’Houdetot. It is a well-known fact that Rousseau wrote the Nouvelle 
Heloïse precisely in the attempt to overcome the subjective and objective 
difficulties of his unrequited love (Forni Rosa 2012, 7-17). Rousseau must 
resign himself to enjoying the Countess’ friendship, because this is the only 
way in which he can settle the dispute between passion and virtue without 
giving up Sophie (Forni 2010, 183-193). The six letters that illustrate the 
evolution of the relationship between Rousseau and Sophie d’Houdetot 
probably were never mailed, but they are written with care, probably with an 
eye to publication (Rousseau 2012, XVII, 327). The fourth and fifth letters 
are especially important for the history of the Profession of Faith, since 
Rousseau has inserted passages from them into the Vicar’s speech11. 
 In the fifth letter, Rousseau begins by remarking that the entire 
morality of man is in his intention. No action is good and just if the person 
doing it does not feel he must do it because it is good and just. Good actions 
leave in the actor a feeling of happiness and generate an instinctive 
inclination to approval in those witnessing their performance. The opposite is 
true for bad actions. This proves that the principle of goodness is present in 
the hearts of all men. In fact, authors of crimes in other circumstances 
generally show they possess a sensitive and good heart. Despite the 
“prodigious variety” of customs and cults in the nations of the world, one 
will find the same principles of justice and honesty everywhere (Rousseau 
2012, XVII, 358-359). Rousseau shows, against the inertia and immorality 
deriving from scepticism, that among the pagans vice was admitted in the 
Olympus, but not in the human beings (Rousseau 2012, XVII, 360-361). 
In their intellectual judgement, men are influenced by fortuitous 
conditionings and associations, by custom and by the knowledge they have 
acquired, but in the field of morals, they are absolutely autonomous: in this 
case the power of the innate maxims is such as to drive us in any case to 
judge our actions and those of others based on the same principles that God 
has given mankind. However, Rousseau laments, this proof regarding the 
original and innate aspect of moral conscience is overshadowed by the 
interventions of many philosophers who assert that the mind is a tabula rasa 
                                                          
11 P.-M. Masson added the last two letters as an annex to his critique of the Profession de foi 
du Vicaire savoyard, Fribourg et Paris (Masson 1914, 479-499).  
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and that it contains nothing but the contents corresponding to the ideas 
acquired through experience. Thus they are forced to deny the irrefutable 
proof of a conformity that is striking and contrasts with the diversity of 
customs. The feelings that nature has given us protect us and guarantee our 
very survival: love of oneself, fear of pain and of death, desire for well-being 
(Rousseau 2012, XVII, 362). Now, since man is a sociable being by his 
nature, or at least made to become so, he can be so only by means of innate 
feelings relative to his species12. In conclusion, the original moral conscience 
stems from the moral system that forms by means of the double relation of 
each human being to himself and to his fellow humans (Rousseau 2012, 
XVII, 363). 
 
The Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar: the internal miracle 
 The Profession of Faith is the confession of an itinerary in search of 
truth. The starting point is a state of doubt and uncertainty that, although 
Descartes considers it indispensable in the investigation of truth, Rousseau 
finds extremely disquieting, even immoral because it is «only the self-
interest of vice or laziness of soul which leaves us in it» (Rousseau 2012, 
VIII, 676). As in the Moral Letters, Rousseau confesses he feels that the 
doubt regarding what is most dear to him is «too violent a state for the 
human mind» (Rousseau 2012, VIII, 677). Permanent doubt is a pathological 
condition that the spirit spontaneously abandons to decide to take a direction. 
Rousseau confesses that he has found in the books of philosophers all of the 
misery of men driven not by the love of truth but by feelings of conceit, by 
the wish to show off, because in the general system of opposing theses «the 
most essential point is to think differently from the rest of the world» 
(Rousseau 2012, VIII, 678). The guide of philosophers once again proves 
itself to be inconsistent, unreliable and even harmful when it hinders the 
acquisition of urgent and essential decisions. One must therefore choose a 
different guide. The first truth that Rousseau perceives and to which he feels 
he must submit is the following: «I exist, and have senses whereby I am 
affected» (Rousseau 2012, VIII, 681). Immediately after having stated a 
starting point based on Condillac’s sensism, however, Rousseau once again 
proposes the Descartian distinction between active and passive, inner life and 
the external world. The existence of others external to me is provided to me 
by the senses, such that I am certain of the existence not only of myself but 
also of the universe, and I perceive I am endowed with an active power 
capable of comparing objects and therefore of judging. 
                                                          
12 Here Rousseau implicitly contradicts his statements on the state of nature and on 
sociability we find in the second Discourse and in the Social Contract. 
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 In the search for truth, the Vicar puts forth an anthropological 
dualism that corresponds to the constitution of a sensitive and passive being 
that is but also active and intelligent. The distinction between communicated 
and spontaneous motion corresponds to the same dualism of active and 
passive. The first motion characterises matter, that moves only by means of 
an external motion; the second motion belongs to the spiritual beings, that 
move on their own. Motion and matter are separate. The two substances 
come together in the human being, in a way that Rousseau finds 
incomprehensible, but that it is not worth investigating. Thus, all of the 
questions arisen with regard to the relationship between physical and psychic 
within a Cartesian context appear to the Vicar as futile and negligible, as 
well as beyond man’s limited capabilities, and therefore insoluble. The 
inanimate bodies of material nature act only if moved by a will, such that it is 
necessary to hark back to the first cause, a will that animates the universe: 
this is the first article of faith. But the order by which matter is moved by 
will, the fact that everything happens according to certain laws, brings me 
perforce to believe that that will also displays intelligence: this is the second 
article of faith. The two articles are all I know about the world with certainty 
(Rousseau 2012, VIII, 691). The third article of faith states the spiritual 
character of man and his freedom. Freedom is perceived as immediate proof 
with regard to one’s self as soon as one acts and, by acting, one intuits the 
match or the mismatch between our action and the principles that God 
Himself has placed into our hearts. Feeling dragged in two opposite 
directions, torn and split between the good he knows and the evil he 
commits, man understands he is not one and, at the same time, that his true 
essence is spirit, because he perceives himself as a will independent from the 
senses, and therefore free. 
 Freedom is the determination of a being to act by virtue of a principle 
it gives himself. Freedom implies obedience to a law that the agent enforces 
upon himself. Therefore, the evil a man commits must be ascribed 
exclusively to himself. Indeed, moral evil is the most important of all evils, 
because physical evil derives from man’s errors or vices, or can even become 
a good when related to totality (Rousseau 2012, VIII, 700-703). God is not at 
all responsible for the evil committed by man. He has given man freedom but 
is not responsible for man’s abuses. Virtue has such a great value that the joy 
it brings is above any other. The immaterial soul may survive the body and 
this justifies the desire of the just man to find in the afterworld the joy he has 
deserved. There are many things that the man’s reason cannot grasp, such as 
the infinite, for example, or the survival of the soul after death, and God’s 
essence. The Vicar laments the incapacity of his soul to embrace the idea of 
infinity and eternity (Rousseau 2012, VIII, 709). The knowledge of good, 
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however, does not depend on an abstract search for the foundations of 
morality, but rather on the intuitive certainty, on the immediate evidence 
with which each one of us finds within himself the universal and 
unchangeable precepts of conduct. 
 Here as elsewhere, Rousseau reminds his Moral Letters to Sophie 
d’Houdetot: the morality of our actions is not taught us by an authority or by 
philosophical arguments, but is established solely by our judgement, since 
the decisive element of the moral action is its intention. Every action 
accomplished is good and just if one feels one should accomplish it for the 
only reason that it is good and just (Rousseau 2012, VIII, 714). The notions 
of good and evil are impressed in the hearts of all men, the voice of 
conscience speaks incessantly also to the wicked and to all those who, driven 
by ambition and by vanity, are less inclined to listen. As in the Moral Letters 
before, Rousseau once again opposes the endless variety of customs, cults 
and usages to the substantial identity of moral maxims, a sort of moral 
instinct or feeling that demonstrates the fundamental unity of the human race 
in every era and at every latitude. The existence of an «innate principle of 
justice and goodness, by which, in spite of our own maxims, we approve or 
condemn the actions of ourselves and others» (Rousseau 2012, VIII, 715)13 
definitely refutes the radical moral relativism that certain scholars insist on 
adopting as a criterion for judging not only exterior customs and cults but 
morality as well, therefore negating the singleness of conscience. The vanity 
of human opinions and the desire to show off transform the search for truth 
into a pretext for triumphing over their adversaries, in a confrontation where 
the prize is not the conquest of truth but rather fame and distinction. The 
difficulty in conquering virtue depends on the yoke of the senses and of the 
body, to which man’s soul is chained. The submission of the soul to the 
body, given the heterogeneity of the two terms, is inexplicable because we 
know not God’s plans, but it is a very well founded theory that, should man 
have remained entirely freed of any conditioning and should his existence 
have been perfectly compliant with moral order, he would have been happy, 
although his happiness would have been without “the glory of virtue”. In this 
way, instead, the man that attains virtue by overcoming the adversities that 
drag him in the opposite direction shall be superior to angels (Rousseau 
2012, VIII, 723). 
 The need of an obstacle for the achievement of virtue and moral order 
in the world transforms the dependence of the rational soul from the body, 
per se incomprehensible, into the necessary condition for achieving that 
                                                          
13Knowledge of good and evil is not demonstrative but intuitive. The notions of good and 
evil are universal and necessary, evident and cogent. Intuitive knowledge, which John Locke 
places above demonstrative knowledge, is as immediately certain as it is unobjectifiable on a 
theoretical level. 
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morality which is at the same time essential to and specific of humanity. In 
this, Rousseau anticipates Kant: without the obstacle of sensitive inclination, 
that per se is the negation of morality, it would be impossible to achieve any 
virtue. The world is as it should be and the only evil that the Vicar can 
disapprove of is that which he himself would commit. The Vicar feels that he 
has absolutely nothing to ask of a God that has given him a priceless gift, 
freedom, because this would mean wanting to change that perfection that he 
himself recognizes in creation. The miracle by which God could intervene to 
gratify those who implore him assumes that the world is imperfect and that 
God wishes to and can fix it with an ad hoc action, making an exception to 
the laws of nature according to an entirely arbitrary criterion, totally 
unworthy of divine majesty. For this reason the Vicar, in a converging 
manner with respect to Voltaire’s analysis, clearly sees the inconsistency 
between the perfection of God’s work and God’s miraculous intervention in 
support of anyone (Rousseau 2012, VIII, 732-733). 
 The Vicar’s faith in reason is justified by the fact that God Himself 
has placed the knowledge of God in the hearts of men. Reason – the set of 
senses, conscience and judgement – immediately understands the essential 
ideas of divinity. Natural religion consists in knowing and serving God 
according to the teachings He himself imparts to my spirit. Compared to the 
true religion, the highest one, the revealed religions with their useless and 
arbitrary dogmas do nothing more than obscure the superior divine dignity, 
adding strange cults and absurd elements, the sole result of which is the 
triggering of disputes and sanguinary conflicts between the various sects. 
Had the peoples of the earth limited themselves to listening to the voice of 
God directly from their hearts, there would have been but one religion on 
earth. 
 The Vicar explains well why there cannot be a true revealed religion 
that excludes all of the others: should God order one religion to be the only 
true one, establishing eternal damnation for those who do not follow it, he 
would have had to send irrefutable and unequivocal signs to all men, none 
excluded, to allow them to perceive it as the only true religion, because 
should even only one man not be reached by these signs and become 
persuaded of their truth, it would be enough to conclude that the God of this 
religion is a monster of cruelty and injustice (Rousseau 2012, VIII, 734-735). 
In communicating the truth to mankind, God must prefer effective and 
reliable methods and means, unless He wishes to receive negative opinions 
that are unworthy of His name. The best way is not by means of miracles, of 
exterior signs, but rather by means of the internal voice. The feeling, the 
voice that speaks endlessly, is the only way in which God can speak to men 
with the certainty that they will listen, that they receive the sign, even if then 
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their actions betray the truth announced by God to their hearts. In Rousseau, 
the voice of conscience is an internal miracle, just like for Locke the signs of 
Jesus are external miracles. Locke denies the existence of invisible miracles 
since by definition a miracle is an event that must impress the senses: a 
miracle is a manifestation of the divine will that suspends the laws of nature. 
 No book is worthy of being compared to nature, with the exception of 
the Gospel, that tells of life and refers the words spoken by Jesus, the wisest 
and most virtuous man to ever have lived, and indeed «if the life and death of 
Socrates are those of a sage, the life and death of Jesus are those of a God» 
(Rousseau 2012, VIII, 750). The history of the Gospel is certainly not fiction, 
because the Gospel indeed contains characters «so striking and inimitable, 
that the inventor would be a more astonishing character than the hero» 
(Rousseau 2012, VIII, 750). The Gospel contains the maxims of natural 
religion, as well as incredible things contrary to reason and that a reasonable 
man cannot admit. The divine part of the Gospel is that which is in harmony 
with the precepts of the heart, with the universal notions of moral 
conscience. This harmony with the heart, i.e. the reasonableness of Jesus’ 
words, and certainly not the miracles, is the proof of their divine origin. 
 This internal acknowledgement is the real divine cult because it 
allows to overcome the purely ritualistic dimension of religion and to 
faithfully transform the contemplated truth into conduct (Rousseau 2012, 
VIII, 751). The Vicar not only warns against the dogmatism and formalism 
of revealed religions – i.e. against that apparatus that is entirely unjustified 
because it does not match any truth according to its primary source, the heart 
of man – but also against intellectualistic investigation and philosophical 
disputes, against the rather cynical unscrupulousness with which allegedly 
illuminated intellects trample and destroy everything that men respect 
(Rousseau 2012, VIII, 757). Thus two are the abuses that drive man away 
from the source of truth, from his heart: on the one side the dogmatic 
apparatus of religions and the system of signs that is charged with the task of 
proving the divine character of revelation; on the other the extreme exercise 
of free thought, the excess of rational investigation and the obstinacy of the 
intellect that divides men without increasing their knowledge.  
The letter to Monsieur de Franquières 
 The letter to M. de Franquières, a character of whom we know 
practically nothing, is dated January 15th, 1769 and seems to be the reply to a 
previous letter sent by the recipient to Rousseau. In it Rousseau confesses his 
scepticism with regard to his correspondent’s still ongoing inquiries about 
the Author of things. Rousseau reiterates here his distinction between 
physical evil and moral evil. The physical evils of which men lament – 
physical pain, the fear of death, death itself – are naught but the consequence 
of the institutions and of the weakness that civilisation has artificially 
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introduced into the life of every individual. Physical evils are the work of 
man, of the process of civilisation, and therefore are nothing per se. Even 
moral evil, the only deformity of the universe worthy of being taken into 
consideration, is exclusively the work of man, since God simply created man 
free and cannot be held responsible for the abuses man makes of his 
freedom. God – infinitely good, wise and powerful – has no part in the evil 
of the world. Rousseau implicitly picks up here the considerations he used in 
the fragment Sur Dieu and in the Lettre à François-Marie Arouet dit Voltaire 
(18 août 1756). 
 Man is entirely responsible for the only true evil, moral evil. The 
origin of evil finds its explanation if one admits the eternal coexistence of 
two principles, an active one, that is God himself, and a passive one, that is 
matter. God combines and changes matter with all of his power – a matter 
that, however, God has not created and cannot destroy (Rousseau 2012, VIII, 
512)14. The very existence of God has a decisive moral significance. It is true 
that all cult forms seem unrighteous, false, hypocritical and tyrannical, but 
this does not disprove the existence of God, and indeed it makes it all the 
more true and necessary, because to remove the belief in God from the hearts 
of men means to destroy all virtue. God is the interior witness of each one of 
our actions, He in whom one can acknowledge the power to read within our 
heart the intention of putting to good use the freedom that He himself gave 
man (Rousseau 2012, VIII, 746).  
 
References: 
1. Z. Bauman, Z. – Dessal, G. (2015). El retorno del péndulo. Sobre 
psicoanálisis y el futuro del mundo liquido, 2014, trad. it., Il ritorno 
del pendolo. Psicoanalisi e futuro del mondo liquido, edited by R. 
Mazzeo, Erickson, Trento 2015. 
2. Burgelin, P. (1952). La philosophie de l’existence de J.-J. Rousseau, 
Paris 1952, cit. in J.-J. Rousseau, Œuvres Complètes, édition publiée 
sous la direction de Bernard Gagnebin et Marcel Raymond, 
Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Gallimard, Paris, vol. IV. 
3. Courtois, L.-J. (1969). Chronologie critique de la vie et des œuvres 
de J.-J. Rousseau, cit. in J.-J. Rousseau, Œuvres Complètes, édition 
publiée sous la direction de Bernard Gagnebin et Marcel Raymond, 
Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Gallimard, Paris, vol. IV. 
                                                          
14 The same dualism is anticipated in the Profession of Faith. Here Rousseau takes up a 
position with regard to an issue, whether the world was created or is eternal, that in the 
Profession of Faith he had declared he would ignore (Rousseau 2012, VIII, 694). In the 
Letter to M. de Franquières, the independence of matter from God himself is declared, 
within the context of an ontological dualism that could however, in turn, pose many 
unresolved problems.  
European Scientific Journal October 2016 edition vol.12, No.29  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
28 
4. Dupuy, J.-P. (2007) Pétite Métaphysique des tsunamis, Éditions du 
Seuil Paris. 
5. Forni Rosa, G. (2010). «L’amore impossibile. Passione e matrimonio 
nella Nuova Eloisa», in G. Forni Rosa, L’amore impossibile. 
Filosofia e letteratura da Rousseau a Lévi-Strauss, Marietti 1820, 
Genova-Milano. 
6. Forni Rosa, G. (2012). «Introduzione» a J.-J: Rousseau, Lettere 
morali, Marietti 1820, Genova-Milano. 
7. Masson, P.-M. (1914). Profession de foi du Vicaire savoyard, 
Fribourg et Paris. 
8. Masson, P.-M. (1970). La religion de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
Slatkine Reprints, Genéve 1970, reprint of the 1916 edition. 
9. Migne, J.P. (1841-1864). Patrologiae cursus completes, series latina, 
Paris 1841-1864, vol. 7, coll. 77-146, 121A-B. 
10. Neiman, S. (2003). Evil in modern thought: an Alternative History of 
Philosophy, Princeton University Press. 
11. Rousseau, J.-J. (1969). OC (Oeuvres complètes 1959-1995, Édition 
publiée sous la direction de Bernard Gagnebin et Marcel Raymond 
avec la collaboration de Samuel Baud-Bovy, Brenno Boccadoro, 
Xavier Bouvier, Marie-Élisabeth Duchez, Jean-Jacques Eigeldinger, 
Sidney Kleinman, Olivier Pot, Jean Rousset, Pierre Speziali, Jean 
Starobinski, Charles Wirz et André Wyss - Collection Bibliothèque 
de la Pléiade, Gallimard, Paris). 
12. Rousseau, J.-J. (2012). Œuvres complètes, sous la direction de 
Raymond Trousson et Frédéric S. Eigeldinger, Éditions Slatkine, 
Genève, Éditions Champion, Paris. 
13. Tagliapietra, A. (2004). Introduzione. La catastrofe e la filosofia, in 
Voltaire, Rousseau, Kant, Sulla catastrofe. L’illuminismo e la 
filosofia del disastro, introduzione di A. Tagliapietra, traduzioni di S. 
Manzoni ed E. Tetamo, con un saggio di P. Giacomoni, Bruno 
Mondadori, Milano. 
 
  
